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1 Introduction
Named Entity Recognition (NER), the task of automatic identification of
selected types of Named Entities (NEs), is one of the most intensively stud-
ied tasks of Information Extraction (IE). Presentations of language analysis
typically begin by looking words up in a dictionary and identifying them
as nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. But most texts include lots of names, and if
a system cannot find them in the dictionary, it cannot identify them, mak-
ing it hard to produce a linguistic analysis of the text. Thus, NER is of
key importance in many Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, such
as Information Retrieval (IR) or Machine Translation (MT).
The NER task, which is often called as Named Entity Recognition and
Classification in the literature, has two substeps: first, locating the NEs
in unstructured texts, and second, classifying them into pre-defined cat-
egories. A key issue is how to define NEs. This issue interconnects with
the issue of selection of classes and the annotation schemes applied in the
field of NER.
The major standard guidelines applied in the field of NER do not give
an exact definition of NEs, but rather list examples and counterexamples.
The only common statement they make is that NEs have unique reference.
For getting a usable definition of NEs, we investigate the approach taken
in the philosophy of language and linguistics, and we map our findings
to the NER task. We do not wish to give a complete description of the
theory and typology of proper names, but to find a plausible way to define
linguistic units relevant to the NER task.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of
the annotation schemes applied in the field of NER. Section 3 describes the
philosophical approach, and Section 4 gives the linguistic background of
∗This article is a slightly modified version of a chapter of the author’s PhD dissertation
[Simon, 2013].
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the theory of proper names. Section 5 concludes the article with the most
important findings about mapping the theory of proper names to the NER
task.
2 Annotation Schemes
2.1 MUCs
The first major event dedicated to the NER task was the 6th Message Un-
derstanding Conference (MUC-6) in 1995. As the organizers write in their
survey about the history of MUCs [Grishman and Sundheim, 1996], these
conferences were rather similar to shared tasks, because participants were
required to submit their results to attend the conference. Prior MUCs
focused on other IE tasks; MUC-6 was the first including the NER task,
which consisted of three subtasks [Sundheim, 1995]:
• entity names (ENAMEX): organizations, persons, locations;
• temporal expressions (TIMEX): dates, times;
• number expressions (NUMEX): monetary values, percentages.
The annotation guidelines define NEs as “unique identifiers” of enti-
ties, and give an enormous list of what to annotate as NEs. However, the
best support for annotators is the restriction about what not to annotate:
“names that do not identify a single, unique entity”.
As for the temporal expressions, the guidelines distinguish between
absolute and relative time expressions. To be considered absolute, the ex-
pression must indicate a specific segment of time, e.g.
(1) twelve o’clock noon
(2) January 1979
A relative time expression indicates a date relative to the date of the
document, or a portion of a temporal unit relative to the given temporal
unit, e.g.
(3) last night
(4) yesterday evening
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In MUC-6, only absolute time expressions were to be annotated.
The numeric expressions subsume monetary and percentage values.
Modifiers that indicate the approximate value of a number are to be ex-
cluded from annotation, e.g.
(5) about 5%
(6) over $90,000
The modified version of MUC-6 guidelines were used for MUC-7 NER
task in 1998 [Chinchor, 1998]. The most notable change was that relative
time expressions became taggable. The MUC-7 guidelines became one of
the most widely used standards in the field of NER. They were used with
slight modifications for the Multilingual Entity Tasks (MET-1 and 2) [Mer-
chant et al., 1996] and for the Hub-4 Broadcast News Evaluation [Miller
et al., 1999] in 1999.
According to the MUC guidelines, embedded NEs can also be anno-
tated, e.g.
(7) The [morning after the [July 17]DATE disaster]TIME
2.2 CoNLL
The CoNLL conference is the yearly meeting of the Special Interest Group
on Natural Language Learning (SIGNLL) of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics (ACL). Shared tasks organized in 2002 and 2003 were
concerned with language-independent NER [Tjong Kim Sang, 2002; Tjong
Kim Sang and De Meulder, 2003]. Annotation guidelines were based on
the NER task definition of the MITRE Corporation1 and the Science Appli-
cations International Corporation (SAIC) [Chinchor et al., 1999], which are
slightly modified versions of the MUC guidelines. A new type, Measure,
was introduced for NUMEX elements, e.g.
(8) 23 degrees Celsius
In contrast to the MUC guidelines, instructions are given regard-
ing certain kinds of metonymic proper names, decomposable and non-
decomposable names, and miscellaneous non-taggables. The latter con-
stitute a new category, Miscellaneous, which includes names falling
outside the classic ENAMEX, e.g. compounds that are made up of loca-
tions, organizations, etc., adjectives and other words derived from a NE,
religions, political ideologies, nationalities, or languages.
1http://www.mitre.org/
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2.3 ACE
As part of the Automatic Content Extraction (ACE) program (a series of IE
technology evaluations from 1999 organized by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)), new NE types were introduced in ad-
dition to the classic ENAMEX categories: Facility, Geo-Political
Entity, Vehicle and Weapon. The category Facility subsumes ar-
tifacts falling under the domains of architecture and civil engineering.
Geo-Political Entities are composite entities comprised of a popu-
lation, a government, a physical location, and a nation (or province, state,
county, city, etc.). The seven main types are divided into dozens of sub-
types and hundreds of classes [ACE, 2008]. The ACE program is con-
cerned with automatic extraction of content, including not only NEs but
also their relationships to each other and events concerning them. For the
purposes of this more complex task, all references to entities are annotated:
names, common nouns, noun phrases, and pronouns. In this regard, ACE
is exceptional in the race of NER standards, where common nouns and
pronouns are not to be annotated.
2.4 LDC
The Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) has developed annotation guide-
lines for NEs and time expressions within the Less Commonly Taught Lan-
guages (LCTL) project. In contrast to the ones mentioned above, these
guidelines give an exact definition of NEs [Linguistic Data Consortium
LCTL Team, 2006]: “An entity is some object in the world – for instance,
a place or a person. A named entity is a phrase that uniquely refers to
that object by its proper name, acronym, nickname or abbreviation.” Be-
sides the classical name categories (PER, ORG, LOC), they also annotate
Titles, which are separated from the person’s name, e.g.
(9) said [GlobalCorp]ORG [Vice President]TTL [John Smith]PER
The LCTL annotation guidelines are the first concerned with meaning
and compositionality of NEs: “The meaning of the parts of names are not
typically part of the meaning of the name (i.e. names are not compositional)
and, therefore, names cannot be broken down into smaller parts for anno-
tation.” Thus, a NE is treated as an indivisible syntactic unit that cannot
be interrupted by an outside element.
In addition to the classical ENAMEX, TIMEX and NUMEX categories,
there are a wide range of other, marginal types of NEs, which are relevant
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for particular tasks, e.g. extracting chemical and drug names from chem-
istry articles [Krallinger et al., 2015]; names of proteins, species, and genes
from biology articles [Ding et al., 2015]; or project names, email addresses
and phone numbers from websites [Zhu et al., 2005].
2.5 Summary
Early works define the NER problem as the recognition of proper names in
general. Names of persons, locations and organizations have been studied
the most. Besides these classical categories, there is a general agreement
in the NER community about the inclusion of temporal expressions and
some numerical expressions, such as amounts of money and other types
of units. The main categories can be divided into fine-grained subtypes
and classes, and marginal types are sometimes included for specific tasks.
Annotation guidelines usually do not go further in defining NEs than say-
ing that they are “unique identifiers” or that they “uniquely refer” to an
entity. Only one of the guidelines mentions the meaning and composi-
tionality of NEs: it postulates NEs as indivisible units, although earlier
guidelines allow embedded NEs.
3 Language Philosophical Views: from Mill to
Kripke
3.1 John Stuart Mill
“A proper name is a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing
it is that we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it”, writes
John Stuart Mill in his 1843 A Sytem of Logic [Mill, 2002]. According to him,
the semantic contribution of a name is its referent and only its referent.
One of his examples illustrating this statement is the name of the town
Dartmouth. The town was probably named after its localization, because
it lies at the mouth of the river Dart. But if the river had changed its course,
so that the town no longer lay at the mouth of the Dart, one could still use
the name ‘Dartmouth’ to refer to the same place as before. Thus, it is not
part of the meaning of the name ‘Dartmouth’ that the town so named lies
at the mouth of the Dart.
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3.2 Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell
Gottlob Frege’s puzzle of the Morning Star and the Evening Star chal-
lenges the Millian conception of names. In his famous work U¨ber Sinn
und Bedeutung [Frege, 2000], he distinguishes between sense (Sinn) and ref-
erence (Bedeutung). Without the distinction between sense and reference,
the following sentences would be equal:
(10) The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
(11) The Morning Star is the Morning Star.
Both names have the same reference (Venus), so they should be inter-
changeable. However, since the thought expressed by Example 10 is dis-
tinct from the thought expressed by Example 11, the senses of the two
names are different. While Example 11 seems to be an empty tautology,
Example 10 can be an informative statement, even a scientific discovery. If
somebody did not know that the Evening Star is the Morning Star, he/she
could think that Example 11 is true, while Example 10 is false.
To solve the puzzle, without resorting to a two-tiered semantic the-
ory, Bertrand Russell used the description theory. The description theory
of names states that each name has the semantic value of some definite
description [Cumming, 2012]. For example, ‘Aristotle’ might have the se-
mantic value of ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’. ‘The Morning Star’
and ‘the Evening Star’ might correspond in semantic value to different
definite descriptions, and would make different semantic contributions to
the sentences in which they occur.
Frege and Russell both argue that Mill was wrong: a proper name is a
definite description abbreviated or disguised, and such a description gives
the sense of the name. According to Frege, a description may be used
synonymously with a name, or it may be used to fix its reference.
3.3 Saul Kripke
Saul Kripke concurred only partially with Frege’s theory. Description fixes
reference, but the name denoting that object is then used to refer to that
object, even if referring to counterfactual situations where the object does
not have the properties in question, writes Kripke in Naming and Necessity
[Kripke, 2000]. One of Kripke’s examples is Go¨del and the proof of incom-
pleteness of arithmetic. If it turned out that Go¨del was not the man who
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, Go¨del would not be called ‘the
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man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’, but he would still be
called ‘Go¨del’. Thus, names are not equal to definite descriptions.
Kripke postulates proper names as rigid designators. Something is a
rigid designator if it designates the same object in every possible world.
The concept of a possible world (or counterfactual situation) is used in
modal semantics, where the sentence ‘Frank might have been a revolution-
ist’ is interpreted as a quantification over possible worlds. Kripke suggests
an intuitive test to find out what is a rigid designator. An updated exam-
ple: ‘the President of the US in 2017’ designates a certain man, Trump;
but someone else (e.g. Clinton) may have been the President in 2017, and
Trump might not have; so this designator is not rigid. When talking about
what would happen to Trump in a certain counterfactual situation, we are
talking about what would happen to him. So ‘Trump’ is a rigid designator.
In the case of proper names, reference can be fixed in various ways.
In the case of initial baptism it is typically fixed by ostension or descrip-
tion. Otherwise, the reference is usually determined by a chain, passing
the name from link to link. In general, the reference depends not just on
what we think, but on other people in the community, the history of how
knowledge of the name has spread. It is by following such a history that
one gets to the reference.
Kripke argues that proper names are not the only kinds of rigid des-
ignators: species names, such as tiger, or mass terms, such as gold, certain
terms for natural phenomena, such as heat, and measurement units, such
as one meter are also examples. There is a difference between the phrase
‘one meter’ and the phrase ‘the length of the metre bar at t0’. The first
phrase is meant to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds,
which in the actual world happens to be the length of the metre bar at t0.
On the other hand, ‘the length of the metre bar at t0’ does not designate
anything rigidly.
3.4 Summary
Kripke goes back to the Millian theory of names, and at the same time
breaks up with Frege’s theory, when he writes that proper names do not
have sense, only reference. He declares that a proper name is a rigid desig-
nator, which designates the same object in every possible world. Through
examples he proves that definite descriptions are not synonymous with
names, but they can still fix a referent. In the case of proper names, the
reference can be fixed in an initial baptism, after which the name spreads
in the community by a chain, from link to link. In Kripke’s theory, species
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names, mass terms, natural phenomena and measurement units are also
rigid designators.
4 The Linguistic Approach
Besides the theory of rigid designators, another concept used in the litera-
ture to define NEs is that of unique reference. In Subsection 4.1, we clear
the meaning of the phrase ‘unique reference’, which seems to be used non-
systematically in NER guidelines. Unique reference can act as the separa-
tor line between proper names and common nouns. There are however
certain linguistic properties by which we can make a stronger distinction,
as described in Subsection 4.2. The main feature distinguishing between
them is the issue of compositionality, which is discussed in Subsection 4.3.
Finally, we sum up our findings about the linguistic background of proper
names in Subsection 4.4.
4.1 Unique Reference
In the MUC guidelines [Chinchor, 1998], the definition of what to anno-
tate as NEs is as follows: “proper names, acronyms, and perhaps mis-
cellaneous other unique identifiers”, and what not to annotate as NEs:
“artifacts, other products, and plural names that do not identify a single,
unique entity”. In the LCTL guidelines we find this definition: “a NE is a
phrase that uniquely refers to an object by its proper name, acronym, nick-
name or abbreviation” [Linguistic Data Consortium LCTL Team, 2006].
Let’s take these definitions one by one. In the first case, the phrase
‘unique identifiers’ is coordinated with ‘proper names’ and ‘acronyms’,
and ‘unique’ is an attributive adjective modifying the noun ‘identifiers’. So
‘unique’ means here that the identifier is unique, similarly to proper names
and acronyms. In the second case, however, it is the entity a linguistic unit
refers to that must be unique in order for the unit to qualify as a NE. In the
LCTL guidelines, the phrase ‘uniquely refers’ means something similar as
in the first case, it is therefore the referring linguistic unit that must be
unique, not the entity in the world to which it refers.
Here and in several other places in the literature, the difference be-
tween the concepts of referring act and reference seems to be blurred.
When trying to determine what is unique, we find that in most grammar
books the names and the entities they refer to are not clearly distinguished.
However, it does matter whether we are talking about Charlie or about
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the name ‘Charlie’. To prevent such an ambiguity, we always indicate the
meta-linguistic usage by single quotation marks.
By investigating various definition of proper names, we can conclude
that names refer to a unique entity (e.g. London), so names have unique ref-
erence [Quirk and Greenbaum, 1980], in contrast to common nouns, which
refer to a class of entities (e.g. cities), or non-unique instances of a certain
class (e.g. city). However, we can refer to and even identify an entity by
means of common nouns. The difference is that proper names, even stand-
ing by themselves, always identify entities, while a common noun can do
so only in such cases when it constitutes a noun phrase with other linguis-
tic units. Common nouns may stand with a possessive determiner (e.g. my
car), or with a demonstrative (e.g. this car), or can be a part of a description
(e.g. the car that I saw yesterday).
Many proper names share the feature of having only one possible refer-
ence, but a wide range of them refer to more than one object in the world.
For example, ‘Washington’ can refer to thousands of people who have
‘Washington’ as their surname or given name, a US state, the capital of
the US, cities and other places throughout America and the UK, roads,
lakes, mountains, educational organizations, and so forth. These kind of
proper names are referentially multivalent [Anderson, 2007], but each of
the references is still unique.
Some proper names occur in plural form, optionally or exclusively. In
the latter case, the plural suffix is an inherent part of the name. These are
the so called pluralia tantum (e.g. Carpathians, Pleiades). According to their
surface form, it might seem that they can be broken down into smaller
pieces, but the Carpathians do not consist of carpathian1, carpathian2, ...,
carpathiann, just as the Pleiades do not consist of pleiades. These names
refer to groups of entities considered unique.
Names of brands, artifacts, and other products can be optionally used
in plural form. For example, ‘Volvo’ is a proper name referring to a unique
company. But if we put it in a sentence, like ‘He likes Volvos’, it will re-
fer to particular vehicles. This is a kind of metonymy, with the company
name used to refer to a product of this company. Proper names in plural
form can also be used in other kinds of figures of speech, for example in
metaphors. In the phrase ‘a few would-be Napoleons’, some characteris-
tics of the emperor are associated with men to which the word ‘Napoleons’
refers. In these cases, proper names act like common nouns, i.e. they have
no unique reference.
Additionally, there are a quite large number of linguistic units which
are on the border between proper names and common nouns, because
it is difficult to determine whether their reference is unique. Typically,
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they are used as proper names in some languages, but as common nouns
in other ones. The difficulty of classification is usually mirrorred even
in the spelling rules. For example, in the case of events (World War II,
Olympic Games in English; 2. vila´gha´boru´, olimpiai ja´te´kok in Hungarian; Se-
gunda Guerra Mundial, Juegos Olı´mpicos in Spanish; Seconde Guerre mondiale,
Jeux olympiques in French), expressions for days of the week and months of
the year (Monday, August in English; he´tfo˝, augusztus in Hungarian; lunes,
agosto in Spanish; lundi, aouˆt in French), expressions for languages, nation-
alities, religions and political ideologies (Hungarian, Catholic, Marxist in
English; magyar, katolikus, marxista in Hungarian; hu´ngaro, cato´lica, marxista
in Spanish; hongrois, catholique, marxiste in French), etc. Categories vary
across languages, so there seems to be no language-independent, general
rule for classifying proper names.
4.2 Distinction between Proper Names and Common
Noun Phrases
As mentioned above, proper nouns are distinguished from common
nouns on the basis of the uniqueness of their reference. However, we can
make a stronger distinction based on other linguistic properties.
First, we have to clarify the disctinction between proper nouns and
proper names made by current works in linguistics (e.g. [Anderson, 2007;
Huddleston and Pullum, 2002]). Since the term ‘noun’ is used for a class of
single words, only single-word proper names are proper nouns: ‘Ivan’ is
both a proper noun and a proper name, but ‘Ivan the Terrible’ is a proper
name that is not a proper noun. From this distinction follows that proper
names cannot be compared to a single common noun, but to a noun phrase
headed by a common noun. A proper noun by itself constitutes a noun
phrase, while common nouns need other elements. In Subsection 4.1, we
give a few examples. In the subsequent analysis, proper names and com-
mon noun phrases are juxtaposed.
Distinction between proper nouns and common nouns is commonly
made with reference to semantic properties. One of them is the classic ap-
proach: entities described by a common noun, e.g. ‘horse’, are bound to-
gether by some resemblances, which can be summed up in the abstract
notion of ‘horsiness’ or ‘horsehood’ [Gardiner, 1957]. A proper name,
on the contrary, is a distinctive badge: there is no corresponding resem-
blance among the Charlies that could be summed up as ‘Charlieness’ or
‘Charliehood’. Thus, we can say that common nouns realize abstraction,
while proper names make distinction. However, Katz [1972] argues that
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the meaninglessness of names means that one cannot establish a semantic
distinction between proper names and common noun phrases. The latter
are compositional, because their meaning is determined by their structure
and the meanings of their constituents [Gendler Szabo´, 2008], while proper
names “allow no analysis and consequently no interpretation of their el-
ements”, quoting Saussure [1959]. Thus, proper names are arbitrary lin-
guistic units, and are therefore not compositional. (See 4.3 for more de-
tails.)
Moving on to syntax, common noun phrases are compositional,
i.e. they can be divided into smaller units, while proper names are indi-
visible syntactic units. This is confirmed by the fact that proper names
cannot be modified internally, as can be seen in these examples:
(12) beautiful King’s College
(13) *King’s beautiful College
(14) my son’s college
(15) my son’s beautiful college
Further evidence is that in Hungarian and other highly agglutinative
languages, the inflection always goes to the end of the proper name con-
stituting a noun phrase. Example 16 presents the inflection of a proper
name (here: a title), while Example 17 shows its common noun phrase
counterpart (consider the second determiner in the latter):
(16) La´ttam az Egerek e´s embereket. ‘I saw (Of Mice and Men).ACC’
(17) La´ttam az egereket e´s az embereket. ‘I saw the mice.ACC and the
men.ACC’
From the perspective of morphology, proper names must always be sa-
cred, which means that the original form of a proper name must be recon-
structible from the inflected form [Deme, 1956]. This requirement is mir-
rorred even in the current spelling rules in Hungarian: e.g. Papp-pal ‘with
Papp’, Hermann-nak ‘to Hermann’. Some proper names in Hungarian have
common noun counterparts as well, e.g. Fodor∼fodor (‘frill’), Arany∼arany
(‘gold’). Since the word ‘fodor’ is exceptional, when inflecting it as a com-
mon noun, the rule of vowel drop is applied: fodrot ‘frill.ACC’. However,
when inflecting it as a proper name, it is inflected regularly, without drop-
ping the vowel: Fodort ‘Fodor.ACC’. The common noun ‘arany’ also has
exceptional marking, it is lowering, which means that it has a as a link
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vowel in certain inflectional forms, e.g. in the accusative, instead of the
regular bare accusative marker: aranyat ‘gold.ACC’. But as a proper name,
it is inflected regularly: Aranyt ‘Arany.ACC’ (for more details, see Kornai
[1994] and Kenesei et al. [2012]). Psycholinguistic experiments on Hun-
garian morphology also confirm that proper names are inflected regularly
[Luka´cs, 2001], while common nouns may have exceptional markings.
4.3 The Non-compositionality of Proper Names
In order to examine whether proper names are compositional or arbitrary
linguistic units, here we give an analysis of how knowledge about the
named entity can be deduced from the name. Proper names are not sim-
ply arbitrary linguistic units, but they show the arbitrariness most clearly
of all, since one can give any name to his/her dog, ship, etc. It follows
from the arbitrariness of the initial baptism that proper names say nothing
about the properties of the named entity, in fact they do not even indicate
what kind of entity we are talking about (a dog, a ship, etc.).
Although monomorphemic proper names are classic examples of non-
compositionality, they are not semantically empty. For instance, Charlie
is a boy by default, but this name is often given to girls in the US, and
of course it can be given to pets or products. Semantic implications of
proper names (if any) are therefore defeasible. This is in contrast with
common nouns, since we cannot call a table ‘chair’ without violating the
Gricean maxims [Grice, 1975]. Monomorphemic proper names have only
one non-defeasible semantic implication, namely if one is called X, then
the predicate ‘it is called X’ will be true (cf. the Millian theory of proper
names in Section 3).
In the context of the current analysis, two types of polymorphemic
proper names can be distinguished. First, there are phrases which are
headed by a common noun and modified by a proper name, e.g. Roosevelt
square, Columbo pub. The second type consists of two (or more) proper
nouns, e.g. Theodore Roosevelt, Volvo S70.
In the case of the former, more frequent type, every non-defeasible se-
mantic implication (except the fact of the naming) comes from the head,
the modifier does not make any contribution. This can be shown by re-
moving the head: from the sentence ‘You are called from the Roosevelt’,
one cannot determine the source of the call, which might come from the
Roosevelt Hotel, from the Roosevelt College, or from a bar in Roosevelt
square. All we have is the trivial implication, that Roosevelt is the name of
the place. The fact that the modifier contributes nothing to the semantics
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of the entire construction can be illustrated better by replacing the proper
names with empty elements, e.g. A square, B pub. The acceptability of the
construction is not compromised even in this case. One further argument
against compositionality is that if we try to apply it to polymorphemic
proper names, we get unacceptable result: Roosevelt has not lived on Roo-
sevelt square, and Columbo has never been at the Columbo pub.
In the second construction, both head and modifier are proper nouns.
The only contribution made by the head to the semantics of the phrase is
that we know that the thing referred to by the modifier is a member of the
group of things referred to by the head, e.g. Volvo S70 is a kind of Volvo,
but not a kind of S70.
Regarding polymorphemic proper names in general, we can say that
the head H bears the semantics of the entire construction, while the only
contribution of the modifier M is that it shows that M is called ‘M’ and that
it is a kind of F. This is in contrast with the classic compositional seman-
tics of common nouns, where the ‘red hat’ means a hat which is red, the
former president used to be a president, etc., and these implications are
non-defeasible.
4.4 Summary
This section gives an overview how we can distinguish between proper
names and common nouns using an approach based in linguistics. The
first distinguishing property is the unique reference: common nouns,
standing by themselves, never have unique reference. They have to be
surrounded by other constituents within a phrase to refer some unique
entity in the world, while proper nouns have unique reference on their
own. There are, however, proper names which seemingly refer to several
entities; it is shown through examples that these do have unique reference.
Additional linguistic properties of proper names are presented, based on
which a stronger distinction between proper names and common nouns
can be made. The distinction based on semantic properties is the clearest:
common noun phrases are compositional while proper names are not.
5 Conclusion
As can be seen from this overview, the definition of proper names is still
an open question in both philosophy and linguistics. If we try to apply
the findings presented above to the NER task, we will face with various
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challenges. However, there are a few statements which can be used as
pillars of defining what to annotate as NEs.
Early works formulate the NER task as recognizing proper names in
general. This generality posed a wide range of problems, so the domain
of units to be annotated as NEs had to be restricted. In this restricted do-
main, we only find person and place names, which have been postulated
as proper names from the very beginnings of linguistics (e.g. in Plato’s di-
alogue, Cratylus, and in Dionysius Thrax’ grammar). The third classical
name type, the type of organization names has been mentioned in gram-
mar books from the 19th century. Although the range of linguistic units
to annotate was cut, the challenges have remained, since these kinds of
names already exhibit properties which make the NER task difficult.
In the expression ‘named entity’, the word ‘named’ aims to restrict the
task to only those entities where rigid designators stand for the reference
[Nadeau and Sekine, 2007]. Something is a rigid designator if in every pos-
sible world it designates the same object and thus has unique reference –
unique in every possible world. Rigid designators include proper names
as well as species names, mass terms, natural phenomena and measure-
ment units. These natural kind terms are only partially included in the
NER task. The MUC guidelines allow for annotating measures (e.g. 16
tons) and monetary values (e.g. 100 dollars), which are rigid designators
according to Kripke’s theory. Some temporal expressions, typically abso-
lute time expressions, are also rigid designators (e.g. the year 2017 is the
2017th year of the Gregorian calendar), but there are also many non-rigid
ones, typically the relative time expressions (e.g. June is a month of an un-
defined year). Thus, the rigid designator theory must be restricted to keep
out species names, mass terms and certain natural phenomena, but must
also be loosened to allow tagging relative time expressions as NEs.
If we say that every linguistic unit which has unique reference must
be annotated as a NE, we should annotate common noun phrases as well.
However, dealing with common nouns is not part of the NER task, so other
linguistic properties of proper names and common nouns must be con-
sidered to make the distinction between them stronger. The greatest dif-
ference is the issue of compositionality. Applying Mill’s, Saussure’s, and
Kripke’s theory about the meaninglessness of names, we must conclude
that proper names are arbitrary linguistic units, whose only semantic im-
plication is the fact of the naming. Thus, the semantics of proper names
is in total contrast with the classic compositional semantics of common
nouns, as they are indivisible and non-compositional units. To map it to
the NER task: embedded NEs are not allowed, and the longest sequences
must be annotated as NEs (e.g. in the place name ‘Roosevelt square’ there
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is no person name ‘Roosevelt’ annotated).
There still remain a quite large number of linguistic units which are
difficult to categorize. Typically, they are on the border between proper
names and common nouns, which is confirmed by the fact that their sta-
tus varies across languages. We should not forget that the central aim of
the NER task is extracting important information from raw text, most of
which is contained by NEs. Guidelines should be flexible enough to al-
low the annotation of such important pieces of information. For getting
a usable definition of NEs, the classic Aristotelian view on classification,
which states that there must be a differentia specifica which allows some-
thing to be the member of a group, and excludes others, is not applicable.
For our purposes, the prototype theory [Rosch, 1973] seems more plau-
sible, where proper names form a continuum ranging from prototypical
(person and place names) to non-prototypical categories (product and lan-
guage names) [Van Langendonck, 2007] (consider the parallelism with the
order in which names are mentioned in grammar books). Finally, the goal
of the NER application will further restrict the range of linguistic units to
be taken into account.
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